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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that the defendant retained sufficient contacts with New York to
enable the court to grant incidental in personam relief without "offend-
[ing] traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"18 and that
[p]ublic policy and interest of the State in the marital status and
financial support of a dependent wife dictate that this court should
assume such jurisdiction in matrimonial actions . . . as may be
constitutionally permissible.19
Although the dissenting opinion is supported by authority in
foreign jurisdictions, until the Legislature acts to include marital
actions under the long-arm statute,20 no in personam relief should be
awarded against a nondomiciliary served without the state who does
not appear in the action or otherwise consent to in personam jurisdic-
tion. Until that time, plaintiffs may seek support either by a Uniform
Support Act proceeding 2l or by bringing an action in the defendant's
state or domicile.
CPLR 302(a)(1): Further construction of the phrase "transaction of
business."
The Southern District Court of New York has chosen, in Monclair
Electronics, Inc. v. Electra Midland Corp.,22 to exercise personal juris-
diction over a foreign corporation under CPLR 302(a)(1) 23 rather than
under CPLR 301 .24 Defendant's contacts with this state, which the
court concluded constituted transaction of business, included: (1) pre-
liminary negotiations in New York by a high level corporate officer;
(2) three trips by another corporate officer concerning the contract,
both before and after its execution; (3) expectation of substantial eco-
nomic benefit from the above excursions into the state; (4) maintenance
of a New York bank account; and (5) advertisement of its products
in two New York trade publications. 25
Compared with McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-Barg Corp.,28 the
183 7 App. Div. 2d at 187, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 149 (Eager, J., dissenting), quoting Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
19 37 App. Div. 2d at 187, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 149 (Eager, J., dissenting).
20 See, e.g., Mizner v. Minzer, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 393 U.. 847,
rehearing denied, id. 972 (1968).
21 See DRL §§ 31-42 (McKinney 1964).
22 326 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
23 CPLR 302(a)(1) provides that "a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
nondomicilary. . . who in person or through an agent ... transacts any business within
the state."
24 326 F. Supp. at 841.
25 Id. at 841-42.
2620 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1967), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 42 Sr. Joint's L. Ray. 616, 617 (1968).
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facts of Monclair are clearly sufficient to constitute a "transaction of
business"27 under 302(a)(1). 2s In McKee, where jurisdiction under 302
(a)(1) was denied, the defendant had made less than five percent of its
sales to independent distributors in New York.29 Additionally, two of
its representatives had conferred in New York for approximately two
hours with the plaintiff, and its northeastern representative had visited
a co-defendant New York company30 "a few times"' 31 concerning this
dispute. While it is clear that "every corporation whose officers or sales
personnel happen to pass the time of day with a New York customer in
New York [should not run] the risk of being subjected to the personal
jurisdiction of our courts,"32 where, as in Monclair, no such danger
exists, 33 jurisdiction under 302(a)(1) should be upheld.
CPLR 302(aXl): Third party's video tape distribution in New York
of monologue not a "transaction of business" by performer.
Whether a nondomiciliary who defames without the state may be
subject to in personam jurisdiction depends upon whether the defama-
tion constitutes "transaction of business" under CPLR 302(a)(1).3 4
This, in turn, may depend upon the contractual relationships of various
parties.
In Streslin v. Barrett,35 the nondomiciliary defendant, a television
newscaster, allegedly libeled the plaintiff in a monologue broadcast in
New York. The monologue had been performed by defendant Barrett
and recorded by her co-defendant, Metromedia, Inc., in California.
The trial court denied defendant Barrett's motion to dismiss for want
27 Moreover, there was a second basis of jurisdiction: (1) solicitation by two commis-
sion companies and their distributors, who had received the exclusive right to sell
defendant's products in New York; and (2) the advertisement in the two New York trade
magazines.
28 In addition to the fact that Monclair presents a dramatic increase in contact with
New York, it is noteworthy that denial of jurisdiction in McKee was by a vote of four to
three.
29 20 N.Y.2d at 379, 229 N.E.2d at 605, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
3o Id. at 380, 229 N.E.2d at 606, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
31 Id. (italics omitted).
32 20 N.Y.2d at 382, 229 N.E.2d at 607, 283 N.Y..2d at 37.
33 In Monclair, the activity of the defendant's representatives in New York was a
necessary part of the transaction. By contrast, the New York activity in McKee was neither
significant nor necessary to the transaction between the parties.
34 CPLR 302(a)(2) expressly provides that defamation is not a tort whose commission
without the state permits the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. However, "if the de-
famatiorn grows out of the transaction of business in New York, the preceding subdivision
[302(a)(1)] would ensnare the defendant since no exceptions are made therein for defama-
tion." 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 302, commentary at 443 (1963). See SECOND REP. 39. See also
The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. Join's L. Rnv. 135, 138 (1969).
35 36 App. Div. 2d 923, 320 N.YS.2d 885 (Ist Dep't 1971) (per curiam).
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